Measuring the Broadband Speed Divide using Crowdsourced Data

Digital applications and services increasingly require high-speed Internet connectivity. Yet a strong “broadband divide” exists between nations [1,2]. We try to understand how big data can be used to measure this divide. In particular, what new measurement opportunities can crowdsourced data offer?

The broadband divide has been widely measured using subscription rates. However, the broadband speed divide measured using observed speeds has been less explored due to the lack of data in the hands of regulators and statistical offices. This article focuses on measuring the fixed-network broadband speed divide between developed and developing countries, exploring the benefits and limitations of using new crowdsourced data.

To this aim we used measurements from the Speedtest Global Index, generated by Ookla using data volunteered by Internet users verifying the speed of their Internet connections [3]. These crowdsourced tests allow this firm to estimate monthly measurements of the average upload and download speeds at the country level.

The dataset used for this analysis comprised monthly data, from January to December 2018, for a total of 120 countries. Using the income and regional categorisations set by the World Bank we identified 64 developing countries and 54 developed countries in seven regions. Complete data for only two of the least developed countries were available so these were not included in the analysis.

The following table presents the download and upload speed averages on the fixed network, aggregated by region and level of development, and the totals for all the countries in our final sample (n=118), while the figure below shows the download and upload speeds aggregated by level of development.

Table 1. Average upload and download speed by region and development level, fixed network. January – December 2018 (Mbps)

Note: Unweighted averages
Source: Author calculations using data from Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index [3]

Figure 1. Average upload and download speed by level of development, fixed network. January – December 2018 (Mbps)

-Download speeds. We observe that the divide between developed and developing countries is pronounced with average download speeds for the latter being around one-third of the former. However, the divide is also evident within regions: in the developed world, countries in North America have speeds three-times higher than those in the Middle East. Within the developing countries those in Europe & Central Asia have the highest download speeds and those in the Middle East & North Africa have the lowest. Overall, download speeds are much lower in the developing world, thus creating an important impediment to the use of data-intensive digital applications and services.

-Upload speeds. We identify that overall there is an existing divide between developed and developing countries similar in magnitude to the one observed in download speeds. However, when looking at the group of developing countries we see that regional rankings are different compared to those identified using download speeds: the East Asia & Pacific region ranks first and North America ranks third – the latter with speeds that are two-thirds of their download speeds. Across regions, upload speeds are always slower in the developing world, and again the Middle East & North Africa region ranks at the bottom; but the divide between download and upload speeds is lower in the developing world. Considering that faster upload speeds are also required in a data-intensive era, the majority of the countries are far from the ideal of having faster networks with synchronous speeds.

Some benefits and limitations are identified when measuring the broadband speed divide using this type of crowdsourced data.

-Benefits. First, the availability of these types of data allows us to measure the broadband speed divide between developed and developing countries using observed instead of theoretical speeds. Second, these measurements are openly available on a website that can be accessed by the general public at no cost. Third, the divide can be measured and tracked over time more frequently than when using survey or administrative data. Finally, this site reports both download and upload speeds which are important to measure in a data-intensive era.

-Limitations. Even if there are data available for a good number of countries there are no complete data about the least developed countries, leaving behind this group. Also, there might be some bias in the production of data as crowdsourced measurements might be coming from ICT-literate individuals in certain countries [4]. Finally, from this source it is not possible to access complete datasets with additional data points such as the number of observations, medians, and latencies for each country.

These findings derive from a broader research project that, overall, is researching use of big data for measurement of the digital divide.  Readers are welcome to contact the author for details of that broader project: luis.riveraillingworth@manchester.ac.uk

References

[1] ITU (2018). Measuring the Information Society Report 2018. Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union.

[2] Broadband Commission (2018). The State of the Broadband: Broadband catalyzing sustainable development. Geneva, Switzerland: Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development.

[3] Ookla. (2018). Speed Test Global Index [Online]. Available: http://www.speedtest.net/global-index/about [Accessed 01/03/2019]

[4] Bauer, S., Clark, D. D. & Lehr, W. (2010). Understanding broadband speed measurements. In,TPRC 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988332

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Data, Platforms and Power

19 February 2019 Leave a comment

We know that digital platforms can be very powerful, but how does their use of data relate to power?

In three ways[1] that derive from the datafication and digitisation affordances of platforms:

  1. Addressing Information Failure. Platforms succeed in part by finding ways to overcome information failures in existing markets. These failures may be sources of power for incumbents. For example, estate agents (realtors) hold power in real estate markets due to information asymmetries; such as knowledge of house sale prices.  Real estate platforms put such data into the public domain, thus undermining the power of incumbents.  Information failures may also be a source of weakness in existing markets.  For example, riders with traditional taxi firms don’t know exactly when their cab will arrive.  Platforms provide such data and so, again, undermine incumbents.

 

  1. Mashing Up. As they deal with digitised data, platforms can gain power by integrating different data streams onto the platform. Real estate platforms integrate online information about neighbourhoods.  Ride-hailing platforms integrate online maps to show cab location and routes to riders and drivers.

 

  1. Controlling New Data. By digitising transactions and associated processes, platforms create, capture and control new data. This bolsters their power; typically by creating new information asymmetries: the platforms know things that others don’t.  Real estate platforms can monitor search behaviours of buyers to understand more about which features of house listings they value most.  Ride-hailing platforms understand spatio-temporal patterns of supply and demand alongside many other behavioural characteristics of riders and drivers.

 

This simple framework can usefully be applied in order to analyse the role of data in platforms, and its contribution to power.

 

[1] Categorisation and examples developed from Drouillard, M. (2017) Addressing voids: how digital start-ups in Kenya create market infrastructure. In: Digital Kenya, B. Ndemo and T. Weiss (eds). London: Palgrave Macmillan, 97–131

Digitally Removing the Middleman for Development: Trouble Brewing in East African Tea?

11 February 2019 1 comment

How do new digital technologies enable firms to develop? One process often highlighted is disintermediation, where digital technologies allow firms to “cut out the middleman”. Exploring the Kenyan tea auction we suggest that these ideas need to be rethought. Digital technologies bring change, but may lead to more challenging conditions for smaller firms.

 

Kenya_mombasa_tea_auction_480_feb2012_2

The Mombasa auction. Source: Wikimedia Commons

 

One of the benefits often associated with digital technologies is the potential for disintermediation – or put more simply “cutting out the middleman”. This concept forms the basis for many hopes for development around digital technologies [1].

In the early days of digital technologies, it was found that they often failed to cut out the middleman due to the “digital divide” where digital skills, infrastructure quality and cost limited the use of technologies in smaller firms. But as firms have adopted technologies and with appropriate applications these foundational claims for digital development are important to revisit.

 

Digitalising the tea sector

Tea is an important export in East Africa and twice a week sellers come together in the Mombasa tea auction to trade tea with international buyers. The tea auction emerged during the colonial era, and with its antiquated traditions, slow speed, and accusations of corruption, there have been demands to move online.

An online auction would speed up the processes of trading by cutting out the middlemen in tea value chains (see below) and allowing tea producers to sell more directly to international buyers.

 

combined

Roles of middlemen in the tea value chain: The tea trade centre in Mombasa, home to the tea auction (left); tea tasting (middle); auction warehousing of tea lots (right).
Source: Photos courtesy of Laura Mann.

 

The auction seems a good fit for digital disintermediation in terms of economic models of transactions [2]. Trade is predictable with a limited number of traders and a strong sectoral governing body. With falling costs of online access in the region, a digital auction seemed viable, particularly as competitor regions such as Sri Lanka and India are already in the process of digitalising their auctions.

 

Challenges faced in the tea sector

While on paper the case seems promising, change has not taken place as expected. An “e-auction” trial was abandoned and over the past decade, digitalisation has been slow and frequently resisted.

In discussion with key stakeholders involved in the auction, we identified three challenges:

  • The nature of transactions: Tea transactions are often seen as generic and simple to trade, and so well suited to online exchange. But tea trading is becoming more complex.  Tasting the quality of tea, for example, is important to buyers who are mixing different teas together to produce retail products, and there is also a growth in value-added teas where buyers need extra information about ethical standards they want met. These factors make moving trading online more complex, where more complex factors need to be included in a digital system.
  • The types of institution: Well-established rules and governance in the tea sector limit the ability to reform the tea auction. The balance of power in sectoral bodies is often skewed towards middlemen, exactly those who might be cut out by digital technologies. This meant that any kind of reform was strongly resisted by sectoral bodies.
  • Middlemen adaptation: Eventually after much resistance, aspects of the tea auction were partially digitalised such as e-payments and digital auction catalogues. This did have an effect of reducing certain roles connected to the auction. But the intermediaries did not disappear. They adapted and took up new roles. For example, tea brokers who were previously important in facilitating payments repositioned themselves as providers of auction intelligence and price data for small tea producers.

A key finding related to these challenges was that international firms, dissatisfied with the slow pace of change, began to sidestep the auction by becoming involved in “direct sales” with selected producers, supported by digital technologies.

 

Making sense of digital disintermediation

The future for tea trade in East Africa is fragmentation which may be detrimental to smaller tea producers. Smaller tea producers were not connected enough to become part of “direct sales” with international firms. With the auction only slowly digitalising, it is falling behind as the centre of trading.

For the analysis of digital disintermediation, the case highlights the need for careful consideration of transactions: the nature of transactions, the role of institutions and potential externalities (such of adaptation of middlemen) [3]. These are factors that implementers might consider to better support small producers’ development outcomes from digitalisation – what are the institutional bodies that need to buy in? Which stakeholders should be considered? etc.

More than this though, a greater awareness of the way actors use their power as change occurs is crucial. Such an approach is very different from the abstract, economic approach normally used to explore digital disintermediation [4]. From this perspective a very different view of development emerges. In the Mombasa auction case, it has not been transformed. Through the challenges and strategic activities of more powerful actors, digital transactions are solidifying the relationships of those who are already well linked, and able to capture resources.

 

This post summarises a recent book chapter: ‘Making Sense of Digital Disintermediation and Development: The Case of the Mombasa Tea Auction’ by Chris Foster, Mark Graham and Timothy Mwolo Waema.

The chapter is part of the new MIT Press book ‘Digital Economies at Global Margins’. The book is available as an open-access PDF from the IDRC website

 

 

Notes:

[1] A good example is the World Development Report (2016) on ‘Digital Dividends’, but many other projects often uncritically assume similar concepts.

[2] In economics, disintermediation is often associated with transaction costs, and an analysis of how digital technologies change aspects of transactions costs: information costs (gathering information about transactions) and coordination cost (co-ordinating the exchange of goods) (e.g. Wigand 1997).

[3] The study of transaction costs can be split into two differing perspectives. The “neoclassical approach” focussing on the mechanics of transactions such as coordination and information costs, and “property rights approaches” which explore wider aspects of transactions such as rules, regulations and externalities (Allen 1999). We suggest that digital disintermediation has been too focussed on narrow “neoclassical” perspectives to date.

[4] Contemporary institutional analysis often explores political power and settlements in shaping institutions. We also stress this aspect here, highlighting the importance of power in shaping institutions, and in turn the outcomes of digital disintermediation.

 

 

References:

Allen, D.W. (1999) Transaction Costs, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (eds), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 893–926.

Wigand, R.T. (1997) Electronic Commerce: Definition, Theory, and Context. The Information Society, 13(1), pp. 1–16.

World Bank (2016) World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

How Many Platform Workers Are There in the Global South?

29 January 2019 Leave a comment

In developing countries, there has been a rapid increase in the gig economy and in the presence of digital labour platforms: defined as “a set of digital resources – including services and content – that enable value-creating interactions between consumers and individual service-providing workers”[1].

But how many workers actually work for such platforms?

I am not going to provide a reliable answer to that question but I will give some kind of ballpark figure.

We start by dividing out two types of platform work: digital gig work that involves digitisable tasks like data entry, writing copy, web design, accounting, etc; and physical gig work that involves a physical task like taxi driving, food delivery, domestic work, etc.  A previous estimate[2], updated to account for growth, would be that there were something like 10 million active digital gig workers in the global South at the start of 2019 (and around ten times that number registered on digital labour platforms but with 90% of them inactive).

So how many physical gig workers are there?  I’m going to break this down by continent since the extent of physical gig work seems to vary significantly between the three main continents of the global South.

Africa

Calculations here are based on extrapolations from just two economies, and seek to take account of wealth and population[3].  Current research for the Fairwork project estimates around 30,000 physical gig workers in South Africa; about half in taxi-driving and the rest mainly in delivery and domestic work.  Estimates for Nigeria[4] plus re-use of some of the same ratios found in South Africa, suggest 20,000 such workers.  Accounting for GDP per capita and population suggests around 60 workers per US$1,000 GDP/capita and per 1 million population; i.e. per US$1bn GDP.  Multiplying up to the overall GDP of Africa produces an estimate of c.130,000 physical gig workers in Africa.  However, given there are at least 100,000 in Egypt alone, we can at least double that to 250,000.

Asia

Similar calculations can be undertaken in Asia, based on numbers associated with platforms in India and Indonesia.  Extrapolating from estimates for taxi-driving and food delivery platforms in India[5], I estimate around 2 million physical gig workers in India.  For Indonesia[6], the figure is closer to 1 million.  Accounting for GDP suggests around 800 workers per US$1bn of GDP.  Multiplying up to the overall GDP of Asia (excluding Japan) produces an estimate of roughly 18 million physical gig workers in developing Asia.

However, there is an alternative approach, which is to exclude China in this calculation, which produces a figure of 9 million, and then take at face value claims that Didi Chuxing employs 21 million physical gig workers in China[7].  This would lead to an estimate of 30 million physical gig workers in developing Asia.

Latin America

Here, I’ve taken a simpler approach based on some national and continent-wide estimates of taxi driving[8] and then re-using ratios from the South Africa work.  This produces an estimate of something like 2 million physical gig workers in Latin America.

Summary

The basis for these estimates is flimsy, and the extrapolations are worse, so please attach a strong health warning to this material.  Better still, come up with some improved statistics.  But my ballpark figure is that there are at least 30 million platform-based gig workers in the global South; 10 million digital and just over 20 million physical.  And that the figure could be more than 40 million, which would be around 1.5% of the global South workforce.

A proportion of these workers are not relying on this as their primary source of income.  For digital gig workers, this number is anything from two-thirds to a half[9].  It may be somewhat less for the physical gig economy, so another ballpark would be that around 15-20 million workers in developing countries are relying on digital platforms for their primary source of income.

(Annual turnover is an issue for another day but, globally and summing figures for the digital gig economy[10] and main physical gig platforms Uber[11] and Didi Chuxing[12], it must be at least US$50bn.)

 

[1] Adapted from Constantinides, P., Henfridsson, O., & Parker, G. G. (2018). Introduction—Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital Age, Information Systems Research, 29(2), 381-400

[2] Heeks, R. (2017) Decent Work and the Digital Gig Economy, GDI Development Informatics Working Paper no.71, University of Manchester, UK

[3] An alternative approach would seek to extrapolate in terms of numbers of Internet users but that is correlated with GDP, and the figures still point to a strong under-representation of Africa in platform labour and strong over-representation of China.  Put another way, factors other than wealth and Internet access are needed to explain national differences in the proportions working in the platform economy.

[4] E.g. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/uber-monthly-passenger-base-in-nigeria-hits-267000/ and https://technext.ng/2018/08/17/max-ng-3-5-things-should-know-about-ride-hailing-platform/

[5] E.g. https://qz.com/india/1385653/uber-ola-drivers-pay-the-price-for-indias-fuel-price-rise/ and https://www.livemint.com/Companies/cYbdfsYk93HFhMuC0XgaNN/Swiggy-Zomato-hike-delivery-boy-salaries-as-competition-gro.html and https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/zomato-swiggy-and-ubereats-paying-higher-cash-on-delivery/articleshow/65142563.cms

[6] e.g. http://buscompress.com/uploads/3/4/9/8/34980536/riber_7-s1_sp_h17-051_59-67.pdf and https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/11/21/the-gig-economy-and-skills-traps-in-indonesia.html

[7] E.g. https://technode.com/2018/03/19/didi-1-5-billion-abs/ and https://www.sustainabletransport.org/archives/6317

[8] E.g. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-brazil/uber-rival-apps-join-forces-in-brazil-to-stem-tide-of-regulation-idUSKBN1D71KE and https://www.ft.com/content/7bf04e08-1d63-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6 and https://www.globalfleet.com/en/smart-mobility/latin-america/news/chile-imposes-regulations-ride-hailing-companies and https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmoed/2018/12/20/is-uber-operating-illegally-in-its-fastest-growing-region/#74c69e161925

[9] Heeks, R. (2017) Decent Work and the Digital Gig Economy, GDI Development Informatics Working Paper no.71, University of Manchester, UK

[10] Heeks, R. (2017) Decent Work and the Digital Gig Economy, GDI Development Informatics Working Paper no.71, University of Manchester, UK

[11] E.g. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/15/uber-q2-2018-revenue-bookings-slow-slightly.html

[12] E.g. https://kr-asia.com/losing-300m-in-2017-didi-chuxing-wants-to-turn-a-profit-in-2018-amid-fierce-competition

How Technology and Creativity is being used for Developing Ecotourism: Peace and Unity as a Shared Value to Overcome Environmental Problems in the West Senegal Islands of Niomoume.

On the 28th-30th December 2018 the first edition of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance successfully took place on the Niomoume Islands of the Casamance region in Senegal (Ceesay, 2019) (Figure 1). The Festival was a three-day event bring together the arts, the Islands traditions, a conference and an Island tour all in the name of ‘peace and unity’. The event was attended over the three days by more than 1000 Island inhabitants, guests and visitors. The Festival was the first ever artistic and cultural gathering for the Niomoume Island and its people. The Festival is an innovative event combining the creative industries, ecotourism under the umbrella of ‘peace and unity’ to come together to solve the Islands’ social, environmental and economic problems. Mr Sens Sagna a well-known and highly-regarded Senegalese artist who is based in the UK was the cultural ambassador of the first edition festival (Figure 2). Mr Sagna through his pride in his West African heritage and his vast artistic experience and skills wished to develop collaborations between the Creative Industries sector (an industry worth £133.3bn and accounting for 8.2 per cent of the UK economy), the University of Manchester to potentially support and advise with the Festival and the problems being faced by The Niomoume Islands and the West Senegal region. Mr Sagna, Ambassador of the Festival explained that, “when the initial idea of the Festival was sent to me, I was immediately interested in getting involved and supporting a positive initiative and further understandings how of the creative arts and his skills and experiences could be drawn into the project” (Ceesay, 2019). He explained that this is the positive direction he would like to see the creative industries take in the future. He emphasised the importance that the festival has for bringing people together, to make the community well-known and for the opportunities it can create. He urged “all to embrace and support the future of the festival”.

(Figure 1- Ceremonial dance by Niomoume Islanders at the Festival)

Mr Sagna is collaborating with Dr Anita Greenhill in looking at the potential of skills development and knowledge enhancement on digital content-building in the creative industries, with a particular emphasis on the positive impact creativity can provide in the development of ecotourism (Oluwatobi Emmanuel Olaniyi, et al 2018, 593). West African cultural skills and knowledge, particularly those associated with their artistic traditions are considered the most developed in the world (Faola & Kalu, 2018). Therefore the unifying values that creativity produces as opposed to a predominantly economic focus in much development theory can be reconsidered. The potential value of the creative economy is increasing exponentially but the industry is still not fully understood and in many instances undervalued. Earlier feasibility studies (Greenhill, 2019) have demonstrated the impact the creative industries can have on social unity and the integration of marginalised groups. Attending the festival has helped to build links and opened up potential routes for international collaboration and research within West Africa.

(Figure 2. Attendees including Mr Sagna, Dr Anita Greenhill, Mr Ousmane Samoure at the First edition of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance 2018)

The initial findings from the research showed that, whilst creativity has the potential to improve the situation of marginalised groups, the artistic community is often caught between traditional knowledge and skills acquisition, and contemporary culture and economic reality (Greenhill, forthcoming). This is a situation that is mirrored in Senegal, where cultural initiatives are being developed which both promote the themes of peace and unity and look to encourage and support economic development. However, a lack of basic infrastructure (especially digital infrastructure) across the country creates a series of challenges (Figure 4). Indeed, Senegal is the perfect place for the arts and healing to come together due to the fact that the country continues to be the location for Africa’s longest ongoing conflict (the Casamance Conflict). Alongside this, the Senegalese state has reaffirmed its desire to put culture at the heart of the issues of national economic and social development. This link is something that is helped by the fact that many West African performers often hail from conflict zones and so represent some of the most marginalised people in the world.

(Figure 3. Festival of the Islands of Casamance wrestling performance 2018)

The growing use of culture, and in particular music, as part of wider efforts to address issues of peace and unity within Senegal is reflected in the Festival activities. The overall aim of the festival is to give all those who participate a platform where they can develop their skills, cultural experiences and creativity. This festival is organised by Ousmane Samoure, one of the project’s community partners, and looks to create a lasting legacy, which aids the development of the region (where there is a lack of basic supplies of clean drinking water, medical provisions, electricity and internet provision, etc.). Crucially, these festivals operate in areas that are socially isolated and, in the case of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance, have never had a cultural festival before (Figure 3).

(Figure 4. Wells are dug in the rice fields for fresh water supply)

The project looks to learn from these Senegalese initiatives and the stakeholders involved, in order to develop and join together similar work being carried out in South Manchester. This will be achieved by looking to establish a prototype for a structured process to creative production that generates social, cultural and economic value by focussing on community-driven innovation (with an initial emphasis on the creative industries and technology).

References, useful links

Ceesay, B (2019), Festival of the Islands of Casamance was a huge success, BlockTV Gambia

Faola, T Kalu, K (eds) (2018), Africa and Globalization: challenges of governance and creativity, Palgrave Mcmillan: Grewerbestrasse, Switzerland

Greenhill, A (2019) Festival of the Islands of Casamance, http://www.facebook.com-The-Festival-of-the-Islands-of-Cassamnce

Oluwatobi Emmanuel Olaniyi, Shadrach Olufemi Akindele & Babafemi George Ogunjemite (2018) Ecotourism suitability of Okomu and Pendjari National Parks, Anatolia, 29:4, 593-604, DOI: 10.1080/13032917.2018.1486329

How Whatsapp Strengthens Livelihoods of Women Farmers in Rural Zimbabwe

Whatsapp [1] (icon shown in Figure 1) is improving women farmer’s social capital – facilitating effective social networks in rural Zimbabwe.  We know that mobile technology use leads to information sharing – with the possibility of building social capital and leading to asset creation.  Some even argue that ultimately this can lead to better and sustainable livelihoods strategies.  There is talk, however, to suggest that many rural women in sub-Saharan Africa have not realised the benefits of mobile technology, despite widespread positive outcomes of mobile phone uptake in agricultural settings [2].  This is concerning, so exploring Zimbabwe’s situation is perhaps relevant and enlightening.

Figure 1: Whatsapp Icon

Whatsapp is facilitating access to support networks which better allow rural women farmers to pursue sustainable livelihoods in Zimbabwe.  Support networks (for example informal farming groups, church and savings’ clubs, as well as formal support from local NGOs and extension workers) are prevalent here.  In fact these links are particularly valuable in an environment (vulnerability context) which is typified by four factors.  First there are complex market trends (like flooded livestock markets and price fluctuations).  Then there are confounding financial shocks (like the lack of capital and abundant cash shortages).  Third are the challenging and extreme climatic shocks.  Fourth is the threat of disease (which is usually high and persistent throughout the year)[3].

Such characteristics are compounded by multiple role expectations on these rural women, and multifaceted, often contradictory structural relations.  Inequalities of access and women’s multiple competing roles limit opportunities [4], and so it seems reasonable to argue that social networks are central to mitigating vulnerability, which in turn enhance sustainable livelihoods prospects for Zimbabwean rural women livestock farmers.  In this sense, social media application Whatsapp is being used to [3] (see Figure 2):

a) Solve livestock problems, for example rural women are able to post/ send photos and videos of livestock to Whatsapp group members with common livestock interests, local vets and extension workers.

b) Help out in emergencies, allowing quick access to Whatsapp group forums to warn community members when livestock is stolen/ when disease threats arise, thereby efficiently coordinating emergency visits.

c) Build and strengthen women’s networks whereby women chat to each other and seek advice/ information through Whatsapp group forums.

Figure 2: A Zimbabwean Woman Using Whatsapp [3]

Essentially effective support is garnered through creating Whatsapp chat groups to openly communicate livestock issues.  Granted, some women do not have smart phones (largely due to cost), but it seems normal that an informed connection is never far off [3].  Also, in true Zimbabwean style, more experienced women farmers share experiences and knowledge with younger women farmers, serving as mentoring platforms where strong bonds are often formed through vulnerabilities and hardships.  A strong sense of togetherness and willingness to assist each other through these open channels ensues.

Whatsapp is accepted as a cheaper, useful and effective way of coordinating meetings (see Figure 3 – a photo with a group of livestock farmers brought together using Whatsapp).  A preferred form of communication, it enables rural women to inform each other, keep records of, and forward important (livestock) information.  It is perceived as being revolutionary in transforming communication amongst community members [3].

Figure 3: A Group Meeting in the Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe [3]

Given its apparent prominence in allowing economical flow of useful information, it is permissible to suggest that social networks accessed through Whatsapp are facilitating rural women’s pursuit of (diversified) livelihoods in an otherwise complex and challenging vulnerability context.  It would be useful to explore how the same/ similar mobile phone applications can be used to provide equal/ further access to key influential social and political networks [5] in order to abate the apparent perceived complex and contradictory structural relations and gender differences in such contexts. 

References 

[1]  Whatsapp is a cross-platform messaging and voice over IP service that allows users to send text messages, documents, images, and other media.  It also allows users to make voice and video callsChat groups can also be formed on the application.  Whatsapp (2018). Simple. Secure. Reliable messaging. Whatsapp [Online]. Available at: https://www.whatsapp.com/ [Accessed 28 November 2018].

[2]  Baird, T.D., and Hartter, J., (2017). Livelihood diversification, mobile phones and information diversity in Northern Tanzania. Land Use Policy, 67, pp.460-471.

[3]  Author’s Zimbabwean fieldwork data, August – September 2017.

[4]  Wyche, S., and Olson, J., (2018). Gender, Mobile, and Mobile Internet Kenyan Women’s Rural Realities, Mobile Internet Access, and “Africa Rising”. Information Technologies & International Development, 14, p.15.

[5]  Ruswa, G., (2007). The Golden Era?: Reflections on the First Phase of Land Reform in Zimbabwe. African Institute for Agrarian Studies.

Categories: e-Agriculture, m4d Tags: , ,

Crowdfarming: Platform-Enabled Investment in Nigerian Agriculture

20 November 2018 Leave a comment

Crowdfarming is fast becoming the easiest means of investing in agriculture in Nigeria. On one hand, we have smallholder farmers who have agricultural skills and farmland but lack sufficient finance.  On the other hand, there are individuals who have money to invest but lack agricultural skills and access to farmland. Intermediated by digital platforms (Figure 1), crowdfarming entails sourcing funds from several individuals (the crowd) to invest in smallholder agricultural enterprises. In some cases, investors receive returns in the form of agricultural produce, while in other cases returns are financial – that is, investors receive their initial investments plus profits [1].

Figure 1: Snapshot of a Nigerian digital platform-enabled crowdfarming webpage (source: Thrive Agric, 2018)

There are currently at least seven active (indigenous) digital platform-enabled crowdfarming agribusinesses in Nigeria. These are: Thrive Agric, Farmcrowdy, Growcropsonline, Growsel, Farmkart, eFarms and Agropartnerships. Drawing from research carried out with Thrive Agric, it is understood that investors (also called ‘farm subscribers’) are considered part-owners of farms they invest in. The contractual agreement between the crowdfarming platforms and farm subscribers provides details on the returns on investment per farm enterprise, length of the production/investment cycle (e.g. see Figure 1), insurance cover on funds invested, and secure online payments. Farm subscribers also receive regular information on the farm’s progress through email alerts and notification of final payments at the end of the production cycle. Subscribers can also apply to visit the farms they invest in.

In Nigeria, crowdfarming platforms are tapping into a large pool of financial investors who are mostly educated individuals, located in urban areas in Nigeria or in the diaspora. Thrive Agric’s model has attracted over 3500 investors, located in 10 countries (Figure 2), who have invested in nine agricultural value chains, directly supporting the livelihoods of over 12,000 farmers (Figure 3), since its inception in 2017.

Figure 2: Geographic spread of Thrive Agric’s crowdfarming subscribers investing in smallholder agricultural production across Nigeria (source: author’s field research, 2018)

Figure 3: Geographic spread of Nigerian states where crowdsourced funds are invested by Thrive Agric (source: author’s field research, 2018)

Despite its growing recognition as a means of investing in agriculture, some factors still constrain the scaling-out of the crowdfarming model beyond its current scope. These factors include:

  • Low level of awareness and trust issues: according to the Chief Technical Officer of Thrive Agric, not many people are aware of crowdfarming and its benefits to both investors and farmers in Nigeria. As such, there is still the potential for more people to invest but getting the word out there, cost effectively, remains a challenge.
  • Currency and bank transaction issues: currently, investing in Nigeria’s agriculture through crowdfarming can only be carried out in Nigeria’s currency (the Naira) due to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. As a result, investors are required to have a Naira account to participate in this space.

Looking ahead: what does the future hold for Nigeria’s agricultural growth through crowdfarming?

Investing in Nigerian agriculture has been described as key to driving the growth of the sector and Nigeria’s economy in general [2][3]. However, the growth of Nigeria’s agricultural sector has been constrained by a myriad of factors especially those relating to low financial investments in infrastructure, agricultural research, high yielding inputs and information delivery [4]. As agricultural production in Nigeria is still largely rain-fed, the issue of timely access to finance, ahead of the rainy season, remains a reoccurring constraint to the socio-economic growth of farmers (ibid). Figure 2 shows that digital platforms are breaking down barriers to agricultural investments in Nigeria by bridging the gap between investors (both home- and diaspora-based) and smallholder farmers.

However, there is still a lot to understand in terms of the long-term impact of investing in agriculture through digital platform-enabled models like crowdfarming. Research is also needed to ascertain the nature of interaction between these platform models and the existing institutional forms that govern agricultural value chains. This will help broaden our understanding and the broader implications for the distribution of value among stakeholders along agricultural value chains that are platform-enabled.

References

[1] Flynn, P. (2015) What is Crowdfarming, Hazel Blog http://blog.hazeltechnologies.com/article-27-what-is-crowdfarming

[2] Izuchukwu, O. (2011) Analysis of the contribution of agricultural sector on the Nigerian economic development, World Review of Business Research, 1(1): 91-200

[3] Udoh, E. (2011) An examination of public expenditure, private investment and agricultural sector growth in Nigeria: bounds testing approach, International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(13): 285-292

[4] Phillip, D., Nkonya, E., Pender, J. and Oni, O.A (2009) Constraints to Increasing Agricultural Productivity in Nigeria: A Review (Vol. 6). International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC

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