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How Technology and Creativity is being used for Developing Ecotourism: Peace and Unity as a Shared Value to Overcome Environmental Problems in the West Senegal Islands of Niomoume.

On the 28th-30th December 2018 the first edition of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance successfully took place on the Niomoume Islands of the Casamance region in Senegal (Ceesay, 2019) (Figure 1). The Festival was a three-day event bring together the arts, the Islands traditions, a conference and an Island tour all in the name of ‘peace and unity’. The event was attended over the three days by more than 1000 Island inhabitants, guests and visitors. The Festival was the first ever artistic and cultural gathering for the Niomoume Island and its people. The Festival is an innovative event combining the creative industries, ecotourism under the umbrella of ‘peace and unity’ to come together to solve the Islands’ social, environmental and economic problems. Mr Sens Sagna a well-known and highly-regarded Senegalese artist who is based in the UK was the cultural ambassador of the first edition festival (Figure 2). Mr Sagna through his pride in his West African heritage and his vast artistic experience and skills wished to develop collaborations between the Creative Industries sector (an industry worth £133.3bn and accounting for 8.2 per cent of the UK economy), the University of Manchester to potentially support and advise with the Festival and the problems being faced by The Niomoume Islands and the West Senegal region. Mr Sagna, Ambassador of the Festival explained that, “when the initial idea of the Festival was sent to me, I was immediately interested in getting involved and supporting a positive initiative and further understandings how of the creative arts and his skills and experiences could be drawn into the project” (Ceesay, 2019). He explained that this is the positive direction he would like to see the creative industries take in the future. He emphasised the importance that the festival has for bringing people together, to make the community well-known and for the opportunities it can create. He urged “all to embrace and support the future of the festival”.

(Figure 1- Ceremonial dance by Niomoume Islanders at the Festival)

Mr Sagna is collaborating with Dr Anita Greenhill in looking at the potential of skills development and knowledge enhancement on digital content-building in the creative industries, with a particular emphasis on the positive impact creativity can provide in the development of ecotourism (Oluwatobi Emmanuel Olaniyi, et al 2018, 593). West African cultural skills and knowledge, particularly those associated with their artistic traditions are considered the most developed in the world (Faola & Kalu, 2018). Therefore the unifying values that creativity produces as opposed to a predominantly economic focus in much development theory can be reconsidered. The potential value of the creative economy is increasing exponentially but the industry is still not fully understood and in many instances undervalued. Earlier feasibility studies (Greenhill, 2019) have demonstrated the impact the creative industries can have on social unity and the integration of marginalised groups. Attending the festival has helped to build links and opened up potential routes for international collaboration and research within West Africa.

(Figure 2. Attendees including Mr Sagna, Dr Anita Greenhill, Mr Ousmane Samoure at the First edition of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance 2018)

The initial findings from the research showed that, whilst creativity has the potential to improve the situation of marginalised groups, the artistic community is often caught between traditional knowledge and skills acquisition, and contemporary culture and economic reality (Greenhill, forthcoming). This is a situation that is mirrored in Senegal, where cultural initiatives are being developed which both promote the themes of peace and unity and look to encourage and support economic development. However, a lack of basic infrastructure (especially digital infrastructure) across the country creates a series of challenges (Figure 4). Indeed, Senegal is the perfect place for the arts and healing to come together due to the fact that the country continues to be the location for Africa’s longest ongoing conflict (the Casamance Conflict). Alongside this, the Senegalese state has reaffirmed its desire to put culture at the heart of the issues of national economic and social development. This link is something that is helped by the fact that many West African performers often hail from conflict zones and so represent some of the most marginalised people in the world.

(Figure 3. Festival of the Islands of Casamance wrestling performance 2018)

The growing use of culture, and in particular music, as part of wider efforts to address issues of peace and unity within Senegal is reflected in the Festival activities. The overall aim of the festival is to give all those who participate a platform where they can develop their skills, cultural experiences and creativity. This festival is organised by Ousmane Samoure, one of the project’s community partners, and looks to create a lasting legacy, which aids the development of the region (where there is a lack of basic supplies of clean drinking water, medical provisions, electricity and internet provision, etc.). Crucially, these festivals operate in areas that are socially isolated and, in the case of the Festival of the Islands of Casamance, have never had a cultural festival before (Figure 3).

(Figure 4. Wells are dug in the rice fields for fresh water supply)

The project looks to learn from these Senegalese initiatives and the stakeholders involved, in order to develop and join together similar work being carried out in South Manchester. This will be achieved by looking to establish a prototype for a structured process to creative production that generates social, cultural and economic value by focussing on community-driven innovation (with an initial emphasis on the creative industries and technology).

References, useful links

Ceesay, B (2019), Festival of the Islands of Casamance was a huge success, BlockTV Gambia

Faola, T Kalu, K (eds) (2018), Africa and Globalization: challenges of governance and creativity, Palgrave Mcmillan: Grewerbestrasse, Switzerland

Greenhill, A (2019) Festival of the Islands of Casamance, http://www.facebook.com-The-Festival-of-the-Islands-of-Cassamnce

Oluwatobi Emmanuel Olaniyi, Shadrach Olufemi Akindele & Babafemi George Ogunjemite (2018) Ecotourism suitability of Okomu and Pendjari National Parks, Anatolia, 29:4, 593-604, DOI: 10.1080/13032917.2018.1486329

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The Puzzle of Digital Financial Inclusion: A Generation Game?

If we thought that financial inclusion and its digital variant are tightly correlated, we may be in for a surprise, judging from the Global Findex 2017 microdata released by the World Bank last month. Owning a bank account (financial inclusion) and owning a mobile money account (its digital variant) throw a puzzling pattern. I plot the averages of bank account ownership and mobile money account ownership in 144 countries across groups of low to high incomes economies, showing a clear separating trend. The thought is borne by 25 low income countries with the two measures of financial inclusion strongly correlated at 0.7. But as income level steps up (to middle and high incomes level) bank account shares increase while mobile money shares decrease. The final panel is flat at the bottom right: most of the 44 high income countries have more than 80% bank account shares with less than 20% mobile money account shares. The correlation? –0.2. One explanation for this negative correlation can be discounted. The digital variant is not yet a substitute for a bank account: savers cannot yet use their mobile money account on its own or as a substitute to secure property or business investment. As countries move up the economic ladder, the puzzle of separation insists on an explanation.

 

Figure 1. The puzzle of bank account ownership vs mobile money account ownership (number of countries in parentheses) Source: calculated from Global Findex 2017 microdataaccXmobXgroup

I explore an alternative here. In high income economies financial inclusion is nearly universal among adults. Not so in low and middle income economies; on the demand side lower average incomes as well as lack of trust in banks coupled with, on the supply side, weak financial infrastructures combine to leave many adults financially excluded. But the costs of financial services, such as sending and receiving money, have been pared down thanks to mobile technology, especially in low income economies. In Uganda, transfers can be made cheaply and directly from the south west to the north east without recourse to Kampala in the centre.

First in this exploration I show a map of the uneven financial inclusion around the world (https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/ accessed 31 October 2018). Map 1 shows that financial inclusion varies along levels of development. The high income economies of North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, are homes to adults with the majority of them having a bank account. Moreover a financial inclusion gradient is discernible with economies around the equator, where many lower and middle income economies are located, reporting lower percentages of account ownership. In particular, available data from African economies in the Global Findex and on the map show how financial inclusion is still a minority story on the continent.

 

Map 1 Financial inclusion around the world 2017, source: Global Findex 2017 report

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But has mobile technology made any difference to financial inclusion? It is increasingly so. A map of ownership of mobile money accounts (those who own an account and use a mobile phone to access it) tells how things have improved (Map 2). Over the last three years, some economies in East Africa such as Uganda or Kenya have accumulated owners of mobile money accounts; West African economies are treading the same path. Although it remains the case that the majority of African economies are home to the majority of adults without a mobile money account (60% or more without one).

 

Map 2 Digital financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa, source: Global Findex 2017 report

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To explore further I build a non-linear multilevel model of accounts for each type of financial inclusion: in one the model explains owning a bank account, in the other owning a mobile money account. The model is non-linear because ownership is an indicator, as well as multilevel because 154,472 adults reside in 144 countries. The models account for country income groups, average national incomes, population, age, gender, education, employment, and personal incomes (quintiles). The most interesting findings relate to the associations with age and gender. I show marginal predictions of age and gender for financial inclusion below.

 

Figure 2. Marginal predictions of financial inclusion (own a bank account), calculated from the Global Findex 2017 microdata

accAgeFem

Figure 2 shows the age gradient of financial inclusion that is consistent with the life cycle effects of incomes and wealth. With age comes accumulation of wealth from earnings that needs to be stored for investment and consumption. So for both genders higher age groups have higher odds of owning a bank account (compared to the youngest age group) in a step-wise manner. The youngest (hollow point ○) and the oldest (solid point ●) form bookends to the predictions; both for men (left) and for women (right). There is also a clear gender inequality, although by age 25 women (diamond ◊, right) already have higher odds than the youngest male group. Thus financial inclusion reflects the life cycle effects of earning and saving.

 

Figure 3. Marginal predictions of digital financial inclusion (own a mobile money account), calculated from the Global Findex 2017

 

 

But the marginal predictions for digital financial inclusion do not conform at all to the life cycle effect (figure 3). Digital financial inclusion does not move lock-step with age. In contrast with traditional financial inclusion, the two oldest age groups have lower odds of owning a mobile money account; instead the highest predicted marginals are attained by the mid-30s. The solid point (● oldest group) for instance is furthest below the hollow point (○ youngest group). Here the two oldest–youngest groups do not form bookends. The gender digital divide is also sharper. For similar levels of other characteristics, no female groups have higher odds of owning a mobile money account than the youngest male group.

The strong age reversion effect (inclusion does not move in lock-step with age but reverts after age 40) suggests a generation effect. This is also consistent with the fact that many of the low income economies are still young while many of the high income economies are already ageing.

The puzzle that digital financial inclusion parts ways with financial inclusion may be driven by the generation effect. But there is no reason to expect that the life cycle effect should disappear soon. Thus the need for financial accounts around the world is likely to grow as adults age, leading to some reconciliation in paths of financial inclusion.

Reviving Critical Modernism in Development Studies

7 September 2016 4 comments

Critical modernism forms a very small, rather dated trickle of ideas within development studies. How could it be updated to serve as a lens for current research?

Critical modernism can be understood as a wide sweep of ideas, particularly encompassing thinkers such as Habermas and Gramsci[1].  But it has only a small explicit footprint within development studies largely triggered by a chapter in Peet & Hartwick’s book Theories of Development, published in 1999[2].  Itself developed from earlier work, this was particularly a response to “post-development” ideas that arose in the 1980s.

Despite subsequent editions of Theories of Development, the core text on critical modernism by Peet & Hartwick remains unchanged, and the specific notion has gained little overt traction in development literature:

– A few works by Giles Mohan and collaborators in the mid-2000s[3].

– A recent paper taking a critical modernist perspective on rights-based development[4].

– Mark Thompson’s paper which included the question of how Development 2.0 would inform the “debate” on critical modernism within development studies[5].

Unfortunately there wasn’t really a debate, but we can revisit the question, to ask if critical modernism is worth rescuing from its development studies obscurity.

As a start, what is critical modernism?

As the name suggests, it is critical; meaning that – drawing from Marxist political economy – it focuses on the structures of power that shape the processes and outcomes of development.  Practically, it seeks to alter distributions of power in order to improve development outcomes.  Methodologically, it listens to subaltern voices: the voices of those who are excluded and marginalised; whose basic needs have yet to be met.  But it differs from structuralist critical theory through two additions.  First, an incorporation of post-structuralism that acknowledges – alongside the power of resources, institutions and structural relations – the power of discourse and ideas: the power of control over systems of knowledge (see diagram below).  Second, an incorporation of analytical lenses other than just class; for example a feminist lens that recognises patriarchal structures of power.

critical-modernism-and-power

As the name also suggests, it is modernist: meaning that it accepts (albeit “critically”) and is optimistic about Enlightenment values.  Teleologically, this means critical modernism accepts the idea of development, with a purpose of progress and alleviation of material want[6].  Methodologically, this means an adherence to scientific method, to evidence-based conclusions, and to theorisation.  But it differs from simple modernism in two ways.  First, because it critiques modernism; not the substance of modernism but its current form as reflected in late-stage capitalism.  Second, because it recognise multiple modernities, as modernism interacts with multiple different localities and their contexts around the world.

From here, I suggest four developments of critical modernism, perhaps increasingly contentious:

a) Ontological development: it is an easy step to aver that critical modernism is commensurate with the research philosophy of critical realism. Hence that epistemological and methodological implications of critical realism apply when researching from a critical modernist perspective.

b) Conceptual development: listening to subaltern voices and incorporating the voluntarism of populist critiques of development means critical modernism recognises the agency of the marginalised – the ability of social movements to effect change, and the ability of the marginalised to use the tools (ideas, technologies, discourse) of the powerful to empower themselves. Hence a denial of structural determinism; instead arguing that structures of power shape but do not determine development outcomes. This requires a re-conceptualisation of power that incorporates both structural power (e.g. power over) and agentic power (e.g. power to); and which identifies power as deriving not from a monolithic structure but from multiple sources, both global and local.  Network theories of power may be especially relevant here; for example incorporating the connective power and agency that comes from membership of multiple and multi-scalar networks[7].  In practice, this means seeking universals and commonalities to link within a wider-scale network those local networks (movements and institutions) seeking to empower those at the margins.

c) Methodological development: “Critical modernism listens to what people have to say … Critical modernism finds worth in all experiences”[8]. If we are to take this seriously then it must include listening not just to the marginalised but also those within institutions of power. Critical researchers sometimes fail on this score; standing outside such an institution and painting a caricature that does not engage with, or listen to, its members.  This listening is itself universally critical: not unquestioningly believing all that is said by either the powerful or the powerless.

d) Critical development: as noted above, a central tenet of critical modernism is a “blame the player not the game” approach – “Critical modernism focuses on a critique of capitalism as the social form taken by the modern world rather than on modernism” – arguing that the problem is not modernism per se but capitalism as a particular form within modernism.

But the same logic must also be applied to capitalism.  Adding the requirements for rationality and evidence base, one can argue three things.  First, that capitalism – as well as being the driver for inequality and environmental unsustainability – has been the driver for many of the material gains experienced in the global South in the past two decades[9].  Second, that capitalism is not a form but forms[10].  And that the problems lie not with the substance of capitalism, but with particular forms that it has taken; notably the lightly-regulated forms of neoliberal capitalism and emergent digital capitalism.  Capitalism is not “a corrupt form of modernism”[11] but a corruptible form of modernism.  Third, that while socialism – even communism – may be highly effective in enabling the transformation from a largely agrarian society into early-stage industrialisation, alternatives to capitalism have largely failed to deliver sustainable later-stage development gains[12].

Here, we teeter to the very edge of what it means to be critical; well beyond what Peet & Hartwick – with their old-school calls for collective ownership of all means of production and all social institutions – would recognise.  The key dividing line lies between those who think capitalism is the problem, and those who think it will be – in some form – part of the solution.

(Likewise politically.  Critical modernism eschews kneejerk direct democracy in favour of reasoned, deliberative democracy.  But belief in evidence would accept this form of participative democracy only where – in practice – it proves more effective than representative democracy at delivering development.)

To summarise a (revised) critical modernist approach to development studies:

– Critical through central attention to the distributions of power that underlie distributions of development outcomes; and seeking to alter those distributions in favour of the less-powerful.

– A network conceptualisation of power that includes both structure and agency; both power over and power to.

– Critical acceptance of values of modernity including reasoning and democracy, development and progress, science and technology.

– An ontology and epistemology of critical realism

– Methodology based on scientific method and evidence that listens to both the powerless and powerful.

– Perhaps, a focus more on alternative forms of capitalism than alternatives to capitalism.

[1] Mumby, D.K. (1997) Modernism, postmodernism, and communication studies: a rereading of an ongoing debate, Communication Theory, 7(1), 1-28

[2] Latest edition: Peet, R. & Hartwick, R. (2015) Theories of Development, 3rd edn, Guilford Press, New York, NY

[3] E.g. Hickey, S. & Mohan, G. (2004) Relocating participation within a radical politics of development: critical modernism and citizenship, in: Participation – From Tyranny to Transformation?, S. Hickey & G. Mohan (eds), Zed Books, London, 59-74

[4] Langford, M. (2015) Rights, development and critical modernity, Development and Change, 46(4), 777-802

[5] Thompson, M. (2008) ICT and development studies: towards development 2.0, Journal of International Development, 20, 821-835

[6] Reflecting the views of many social movements that want not a rejection of development, but progress, material gains, and which often believe strongly in the power of science and technology (Hickey & Mohan (ibid)).

[7] Bennett, W.L. & Segerberg, A. (2012) The logic of connective action, Information, Communication & Society, 15(5), 739-768

[8] Peet & Hartwick (ibid:313).

[9] Hulme, D. (2016) Should Rich Nations Help the Poor?, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK

[10] Henderson, J. (1996) Globalisation and forms of capitalism, Competition & Change, 1(4), 403-410

[11] Peet & Hartwick (ibid:314).

[12] O’Neil, P.H. (2015) Essentials of Comparative Politics, WW Norton & Company, New York, NY; Kornai, J. (2000) What the change of system from socialism to capitalism does and does not mean, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1), 27-42

The Death of International Development?

I have a joke – it’s not a very good one – that in ten years’ time new staff joining my development studies department will have to don the equivalent of the Hogwarts sorting hat.  This will allocate them to either Somalia, Chad, DRC or Afghanistan, which by then will be the only developing countries left.

Sadly, this will probably be an exaggeration but there is a sense in which the development industry is succeeding, and thus steadily putting itself out of business.  Take a look at the ‘five good things’ tab by Hans Rosling at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24835822; or take a look at the changes in the DAC list of aid recipients: the number of low-income countries on the list shrank from 72 in 1997/99 to 54 in 2012/13[1].

So we have an external, objective reality of fewer developing countries over time.  We have some evidence of shrinkage within development discourse: comparing top-10 tag clouds for the MDGs vs. the post-2015 agenda, it is notable that “developing countries” no longer appears.

MDG Post-2015 Tags

And we may also have an internal, subjective reality.  There must be better data on this – please comment to supply – but I was struck by an anecdotal report from a colleague who has travelled to a number of African countries in the past few  months.  She found the young Africans she met were unwilling to accept the “developing country” label for their nations, which they saw as stigmatising.  They saw the development industry typically focusing on the negative[2], and missing out on enterprise, innovation, investment, opportunity and other related keyword identities.

In part, this data just reinforces past messages on development becoming a more intra- than inter-country phenomenon e.g. that the majority of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries, and may well continue to do so in coming decades.  So we see a decline of the national, geographic identity of development both externally and internally: perhaps a better title would have been “the death of the developing country”.  But we also see signs – in Rosling’s presentation but more generally in progress on the MDGs – of fewer individuals overall suffering at the wrong end of the socio-economic development continuum.

While much of this is contested and could be reversed, the direction of travel at present seems clear and it will have important implications.

First, for the notion of international development.  One can see this reflected in the changes from the MDGs to the post-2015 agenda, as discussed in a number of prior blog entries.  While mainstream notions of economic development and social development remain; they now sit alongside other views: sustainable development, inclusive development, open development, institutional development.  The development hegemony of the global North is also being challenged by Southern models of development.  In other words we have an increasingly pluralistic notion of development which must bring with it niches and fragmentation in the field.  In turn, these could well bring a lack of focus and lower profile for international development[3].

Second, for development studies departments[4].  Do they shrink themselves down alongside the shrinking of low-income countries?  Do they convert themselves into area studies departments?  Do they convert themselves into more cross-cutting departments that focus on global challenges: poverty, environment, inequality?  Do they embrace the intersections with business schools and expand to encompass the “emerging economy” notion?  Linked to all these possibilities is again the question of identity: how do development studies departments brand themselves externally, and think of themselves internally to match the changing development context?

 

[1] I’ll leave aside the discussion about the extent to which the development industry is the cause of the improvements Rosling and the DAC list describe.

[2] Negative external projections of Africa are, of course, a long-term concern – see, e.g., Pratt, C.B. (1980) The reportage and images of Africa in six US news and opinion magazines, Gazette, 26(1), 31-45

[3] For analysis of the loss of focus in development see, e.g., http://www.societies.cam.ac.uk/cisa/documents/Chang_Hamlet_Paper.pdf

[4] For an analysed defence of development studies against dissolution, albeit from 2003, see: http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/WG_Documents/Reg_WG/lister.pdf

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