Digital China, Platforms, Agriculture, Health: New Research Outputs from CDD Manchester

Recent outputs – on Digital China; Digital platforms; Digital agriculture; Digital health – from Centre for Digital Development researchers, University of Manchester:

DIGITAL CHINA

China’s Digital Expansion in the Global South: Systematic Literature Review and Future Research Agenda (open access) by Richard Heeks, Angelica V. Ospina, Christopher Foster, Ping Gao, Xia Han, Nicholas Jepson, Seth Schindler & Qingna Zhou.  This paper reviews the literature about China’s growing digital presence in the low- and middle-income countries of the global south.  It outlines seven key issues relating to this growth, and describes a six-part future research agenda.

Special Issue of The Information Society on “China’s Digital Expansion in the Global South”, edited by CDD members.  Six papers discuss China’s digital impact in Latin America, North Africa and Asia covering issues including platforms, e-commerce, technology transfer and digital surveillance.

Understanding Mechanisms of Digital Transformation in State-Owned Enterprises in China: An Institutional Perspective by Guanyu Liu, Jiaqi Liu, Ping Gao, Jiang Yu & Zhengning Pu. This reports comparative case studies on China Mobile and China Unicom to explore how both institutional pressures and technological attraction impact digital transformation in state-owned-enterprises in China.

DIGITAL PLATFORMS

Conceptualizing Variety in Platform Capitalism: The Dynamics of Variegated Capitalism in Thai Digital Marketplace Platforms (open access) by Christopher Foster. Digital platforms are expanding globally, yet there is a tendency to interpret their impacts from a reductive globalised view, underplaying patterns of local variation and agency. Using the case of “marketplace platforms” in Thailand, this paper offers examples of how we might consider the diverse patterns emerging.

Fair Work in South Africa’s Gig Economy: A Journey of Engaged Scholarship (open access) by Jean-Paul Van Belle, Kelle Howson, Mark Graham, Richard Heeks, Louise Bezuidenhout, Pitso Tsibolane, Darcy du Toit, Sandra Fredman & Paul Mungai. The paper describes the specific conditions which supported the take-off of location-based digital labour platforms in South Africa, and reflects on lessons learned from the Fairwork action research project in the country.

Identity Platforms and Anti-LGBTQ+ Legislation: Implications for Safeguarding Personal Data by Katherine Wyers, Brian Nicholson, Scott Russpatrick & Silvia Masiero.  Focusing on countries where governments have introduced anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, this paper identifies the potential for enrolment of identity platform technology from intended into realities of use in identifying LGBTQ+ individuals and groups, identifying risks of data-induced harm and routes to overcoming them.

Resources for Annotating Hate Speech in Social Media Platforms Used in Ethiopia: A Novel Lexicon and Labelling Scheme by Nuhu Ibrahim, Felicity Mulford, Matt Lawrence and Riza Batista-Navarro, proposes a new lexicon of hate speech-related keywords across four languages (Amharic, English, Afaan Oromo and Tigrigna) and an annotation scheme for codifying hate speech in social media platforms used in Ethiopia.

DIGITAL AGRICULTURE

The Need for Collective Action for Digital Tractor Lending Platforms in Ghana (open access) by Katarzyna Cieslik, explores the role of farmer-based organisations in facilitating access to digitally brokered mechanisation services in Ghana.

The Role of Connective Interventions in the Collective Management of Public-Bad Problems: Evidence from a Socio-Ecological System Perspective (open access) by Julissa Galarza et al., investigates the role of digital interventions in improving community-based management of public bads impacting rural communities in Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Ghana.

DIGITAL HEALTH

Implementation of Mobile-Health Technology is Associated with Five-Year Survival among Individuals in Rural Areas of Indonesia by Asri Maharani, Sujarwoto, Devarsetty Praveen, Delvac Oceandy, Gindo Tampubolon & Anushka Patel. The mobile health intervention, SMARThealth, tested in a pragmatic randomised trial, has demonstrated its effect on preventing heart disease and its cost-effectiveness. The latest achievement demonstrates SMARThealth’s effect on reducing subsequent deaths.

 

Swavalamban: A Co-constructed Online Professional Development Toolkit for English Language Teachers Working in Resource-constrained Schools in India

Taslima Ivy, Felix Kwihangana and Gary Motteram (Manchester Institute of Education — Digital Technologies, Communication and Education) Santosh Mahapatra BITS Pilani, Hyderabad and Shambhavi Singh, independent consultant,

Background
The Swavalamban project described here is a continuation of work that has explored the role that mobile based apps can play in supporting English Language Teachers who work in what are often described as hard to reach contexts and often lack resources for teaching. They are usually based in the global south. 

The project was funded by the British Council in India (Digital Learning Innovation Fund — https://www.britishcouncil.in/events/edtech-english-showcasing-partnerships-digital-innovation-fund)

The project aimed to identify and address the teacher professional development (PD) needs of English language (EL) teachers in resource-constrained schools (RCSs) in India. The overarching theme centred on the creation of a context-responsive digital toolkit, Swavalamban, co-constructed with the teacher community. The project’s objectives included identifying specific PD needs of EL teachers in RCSs, building an innovative digital toolkit through collaboration responding to these needs, and establishing a community of practice for professional development. Overall, the project aimed to promote sustainable, bottom-up, teacher-driven professional development. The name Swavalamban, meaning self-reliance in Hindi, encapsulates the essence of the project. It also links with recent general developments in teacher education in EL that focus on reflective practice and classroom-based research.

Reach and Impact
The project targeted primary schools in Odisha and West Bengal. In Odisha, six government-run schools in remote areas of Koraput district were identified for the study. Twenty teachers from these schools, which catered to mainly students from tribal backgrounds, participated in the study. In West Bengal, twenty teachers from five government-run primary schools in Howrah and North 24 Parganas districts. More than 70% of the students in these schools were from minority (Muslim) communities. The data for the needs analysis were collected through a methodology based on golpo, khati and adda, local names for casual gatherings for conversations with specific cultural connotations. 

A WhatsApp group was created for teachers in each state to involve them in the process of the development of the toolkit. They were also sign-posted to a larger Facebook community.

During the evaluation phase, the project partners visited five schools, spread across West Bengal and Odisha, introducing the toolkit to the teachers. The toolkit, which is designed by an Indian web designing firm, is hosted on a Vercel platform (https://swavalamban.vercel.app/). Though most of the required content for the toolkit is ready and some of the content has been placed on it, it will require a little more time to make it completely bug-free. In the initial stage, the included video clips were not captured within the portrait orientation of a mobile phone, which was fixed after a while. Similarly, the navigation is slowly becoming more accessible and user-friendly.

 Visual Snapshot

Swavalamban: project implementation and milestones visualisation

Phase 1: Needs analysis: Needs identified and analysed from 11 schools, 40 teachers, creating an in-depth understanding of teacher professional development needs in context.

Phase 2: Toolkit development: A contextually feasible platform designed in India has been piloted in light of needs analysed in the first phase and aims to reach 40 teachers in primary and secondary schools in West Bengal and Odisha. Materials include: written, audio and video guidance; platform used: https://swavalamban.vercel.app/ 

Phase 3: Implementation and Evaluation: The toolkit has been introduced to above 40 teachers in West Bengal and Odisha. The teachers have started to engage and evaluate the toolkit. We hope to develop the toolkit more in future on the basis of teacher feedback.

Implications for the future
Reflecting on the challenges faced during the research, certain adjustments could enhance the effectiveness and inclusivity of future projects.

  1. Hybrid Solutions:

Although India generally has good access to the internet, this does not always reach into rural areas, so looking for associated offline solutions needs considering. Developing materials that can be distributed physically or through low-bandwidth mediums, such as USB drives, helps to ensure that the professional development resources reach teachers even in areas with connectivity challenges. We believe a more hybrid/ blended approach to teacher development might be the way forward for teacher development in Indian rural contexts. 

  1. Diversified Data Collection Methods:

We recognise the fact that there still may be challenges that teachers did not want to talk about publicly in groups. Use of anonymous questionnaires besides the adda/khati sessions could ensure that these untold challenges are captured. Surveys can help to frame scaling up approaches throughout India. We could not employ a mixed method approach due to time constraints. For future iterations, employing a mix of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods can not only provide a more comprehensive understanding, but also help to scale up the project across India. 

  1. Participatory materials design workshops:

Organising participatory materials design workshops can serve as platforms for not only collectively identifying professional development needs, but also collectively developing professional development material with facilitators. These workshops can be designed to include other stakeholders (i.e., parents, community leaders etc.) at times, to effectively identify approaches and support systems for teacher professional development. This approach not only reflects the rich oral culture and community-based culture in India but can make the project and its impact more sustainable. 

  1. Motivating more teachers for participation in the research:

Audio-visual formats, flyers, posters or community meetings, can ensure that more participants are motivated. A major factor in this direction could be the involvement of government officials or educational office-bearers. Their involvement can ensure more active teacher participation. Even regional master trainers can be approached.  

  1.  Longitudinal Engagement:

Acknowledging the time constraints for teachers, adopting a longitudinal engagement model can be beneficial for scaling up the research, and iteratively developing the toolkit further based on teacher feedback. Moreover, rather than concentrating professional development within a short timeframe, spreading it out over an extended period accommodates teachers’ schedules more effectively. 

Going forward
While the funding for this project has finished, we are still working on developing the materials and want to get teachers involved further in the development. The platform itself can be quite cheaply be re-purposed for other projects, and we are hoping to do this for similar activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

AI Readiness of the US vs China

Artificial Intelligence ReadinessWhat is the status of AI rivalry between the United States and China?

In recent years, the emergence of China as the world’s second digital superpower has led to talk of a “digital cold war”, with global competition between the US and China in fields such as telecommunications infrastructure, e-commerce and digital governance[i] and with China judged to be neck-and-neck with – if not ahead of – the US innovation frontier in a number of digital technologies including 5G, 6G, e-commerce, fintech and drones[ii].

The same terminology has also been used in the field of artificial intelligence to talk of an “AI cold war” between the two countries[iii].  Some, however, have questioned the reality of this particular cold war being fought by two global AI superpowers[iv].  In this post, therefore, I look at what the annual Government AI Readiness Index has to say about the idea that the US and China are two matched AI heavyweights.

The most recent Index, for 2023, shows limited sense of China being on an equal footing with the US in artificial intelligence[v], as summarised in the table below:

2023 Index Overall Global Ranking Global Ranking in AI-Related Government Global Ranking in AI-Related Technology Sector Global Ranking in AI-Related Data and Infrastructure
US 1st 4th 1st 2nd
China 16th 22nd 10th 29th

Overall, the US ranks first in the world; a position it has held since the current form of the Government AI Readiness Index was created in 2020.  China meanwhile is sandwiched between Estonia and Austria in 16th place.

The Index consists of the three pillars of AI readiness: government, technology sector, and data & infrastructure.  Under each of these are three or four dimensions, such as digital capacity of government, or innovation capacity of the technology sector.  And each dimension is created from a handful of indicators, such as UN e-government online services index score for digital capacity of government, or AI research papers score from Scimago for innovation capacity of the technology sector (though the measures of these indicators are only publicly available for 2023).  Digging down into the data, one can tell a little more about China’s AI readiness.

While China makes its way into the world top 10 in terms of its AI technology sector, this rests on the maturity of the sector (ranked 3rd in the world behind the US and UK) while it is outside the top 30 in terms of human capital.  Other individual areas of weakness where it lies outside the top 30 include data availability (ranking poorly in terms of open data and statistical capacity), data representativeness (due to relative absence of low-cost access to internet-enabled devices), governance and ethics (ranking relatively poorly on regulatory quality and very poorly on accountability), and adaptability (such as effectiveness and responsiveness of government).  The US was ahead in all categories: most in tech sector maturity; least in digital capacity of government.

One can also investigate change over time, with the position in 2020 shown in the table below:

2020 Index Overall Global Ranking Global Ranking in AI-Related Government Global Ranking in AI-Related Technology Sector Global Ranking in AI-Related Data and Infrastructure
US 1st 2nd 1st 7th
China 19th 14th 11th 52nd

Overall, China has progressed from 19th in the global ranking in 2020 to 16th position in 2023.  Because of changes to the constituent components in a few measures, analysing change over time is far from an exact science but, between 2020 and 2023, China made most progress in three areas: data representativeness, innovation capacity and infrastructure.  But it fell back particularly in governance and ethics and to a smaller degree in human capital.  Relative to the US, China gained ground most in data & infrastructure across all dimensions: infrastructure, data availability and data representativeness.  And it slipped back most in governance and ethics, and next most in terms of technology sector maturity[vi].

All of this must be taken with a pinch of salt.  Indexes have to be comprised of the measures that are available rather than of those one would want: of the 39 indicators making up the index, only three are explicitly about AI.  In these in 2023 – AI strategy, number of AI unicorns, and AI research papers – China is respectively equal to the US[vii], 2nd globally to the US 1st position, and 1st globally compared to the US in 3rd place[viii].  China has also been investing very heavily in AI both financially and institutionally, spurred on by initiatives such as the 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan and the prominence of AI in the 2021 Fourteenth Five-Year Development Plan[ix].

Nor do any of the Government AI Readiness Index rankings or measures deny the frictions between the US and China in this domain where, “in the growing geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, AI has emerged as the new frontier of their rivalry”[x].  However, the Index authors make the argument that, overall, the Index’s constituent measures represent the broad foundations required for AI success, and their work thus provides at least some support for the notion that this has not yet become a rivalry between AI superpower equals.

Image Source: Vecteezy


[i] Heeks, R., Ospina, A.V., Foster, C., Gao, P., Han, X., Jepson, N., Schindler, S. & Zhou, Q. (2024) China’s digital expansion in the Global South: Systematic literature review and future research agenda, The Information Society, 40(2), 69-95

[ii] The Economist (2024) How Xi Jinping plans to overtake America, The Economist, 31 Mar

[iii] Thompson, N. & Bremmer, I, (2018) The AI cold war that threatens us all, Wired, 23 Oct

[iv] Bryson, J. J., & Malikova, H. (2021). Is there an AI cold war?Global Perspectives, 2(1), 24803

[v] Oxford Insights (2024) Government AI Readiness Index 2023, Oxford Insights, Oxford, UK

[vi] As another indicator of this, in 2022 there were 542 newly-funded AI companies in the US compared to 160 in China: HAI (2023) Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2023, Human-Artificial Intelligence, Stanford University, Stanford, CA

[vii] Though equal also with several other countries as the only scores available in the category were 0, 50 or 100

[viii] India ranked 2nd globally

[ix] Though with a history of activity on AI stretching back to the 1980s: Zhou, L. (2023) A historical overview of artificial intelligence in China, Science Insights, 42(6), 969-973.

[x] Zhang, H. & Khanal, S. (2024) To win the Great AI Race, China turns to Southeast Asia, Asia Policy, 19(1), 21-34

Exploring Barcelona Smart Tourism through a Digital Transformation Lens

The evolution of urban tourism is increasingly shaped by digital technologies, with cities around the world embracing innovative models and digital transformation to enhance visitor experiences. Digital transformation refers to the integration of digital technologies into all aspects of an organization’s operations, fundamentally altering how it operates and delivers value to customers (Westerman et al., 2011). In the tourism context, digital transformation encompasses the adoption of innovative technologies to enhance the tourist experience, streamline operations, and drive sustainable growth. Building upon foundational studies by scholars such as Buhalis and Amaranggana (2014) and Gretzel et al. (2015) about smart tourism platforms and destinations, this blog explores a theoretical framework for understanding the key elements of smart tourism through a digital transformation lens. The elements of connectivity, data analytics, personalization, and sustainability are drawn from the Barcelona Smart Tourism Platform, reflecting a holistic approach to digital transformation in tourism.

Connectivity serves as the backbone of the digital transformation, enabling the integration of tourists, service providers, and city authorities, which is in line with the vision outlined by Law et al. (2016). Digital connectivity is a means of creating a cohesive ecosystem where information flows freely and efficiently. This connectivity manifests through various channels, including Wi-Fi hotspots, mobile apps, and digital signage, enabling tourists to access information, make bookings, etc. Moreover, by integrating disparate systems and stakeholders, connectivity enhances collaboration and coordination, fostering a more integrated approach to destination management.

Data analytics enables the city to gain actionable insights from the massive amount of data generated by tourist interactions. Drawing on methodologies outlined by Xiang et al. (2017) and Gretzel et al. (2015), Barcelona employs advanced analytics techniques to analyse visitor behaviour, preferences, and trends. This data-driven approach empowers the city to make informed decisions thereby optimizing the tourism experience, and enables stakeholders to tailor offerings, optimize resource allocation, and anticipate demand, thereby maximizing satisfaction and operational efficiency.

Personalization allows a fit to the individual needs and preferences of tourists (Wang et al., 2017). As Gretzel et al. (2021) noted the importance of techniques, Barcelona leverages AI-driven algorithms to customize offerings and recommendations for each visitor. From personalized itineraries to targeted promotions, this personalized approach enhances visitor satisfaction and fosters deeper engagement with the destination.

Sustainability of Barcelona is in line with principles outlined by Niñerola (2019), Barcelona integrates sustainability across all aspects of the visitor experience, from transportation to accommodation to attractions. This encompasses initiatives such as promoting eco-friendly modes of transportation, reducing waste through recycling programs, and supporting local communities through responsible tourism practices.

As echoed by scholars such as Buhalis (2020) and Gretzel (2021), Barcelona is creating smarter, more sustainable destinations through technology, exemplifying the potential of digital innovation in sustainable tourism by integrating connectivity, data analytics, personalization and sustainability. As cities around the world navigate the complexities of urban tourism in the digital age, the Barcelona Tourism Platform offers a good example, and a framework that others working in smart tourism can utilize.


What AI Role for the Global South?

What role will countries of the global South play in the artificial intelligence (AI) economy?

I recently participated in a fascinating discussion on AI run by Technology Salon Accra, and the points reminded me of a model I developed a few years’ back: the ladder of ICT4D roles which can readily be modified to apply to AI (see Figure 1).

Figure 1  Ladder of AI-Related Roles

The Ladder of AI Roles

AI Non-User:

In these roles, global South individuals are not direct users of AI:

  • Delinked: there is no obvious use or impact of AI for the individual.
  • Indirect: there is no direct connection to AI but it does have some impact.  An example would be use of AI by lead firms in global value chains that impact working conditions of those in the global South at the upstream end of the value chain.  Another example would be an individual in the global South creating data that is harvested as an input to AI models.

AI Consumer:

In these roles, individuals in the global South make direct use of either AI or the outputs it produces:

  • Intermediated consumer: the individual benefits from the outputs of AI systems but they do not directly use AI; instead someone else – an intermediary (see below) – does that on their behalf.  An example would be a farmer benefitting from use of AI by an agriculture extension officer e.g. to diagnose or predict crop disease.
  • Passive consumer: a role in which there is direct use of AI but just to receive “broadcast” information; for example, someone using an AI-assisted search engine.
  • Active user: digitally-enabled interaction with AI; for example, by a prompt engineer.

AI Producer:

In these roles, individuals in the global South make direct use of AI to create something:

  • Creator: creation of enduring digital content.  This is a “consumer-plus” role in which publicly-available models are fed with specific local datasets in order to produce new knowledge, but without amending the model.
  • Enabler: provision of goods or services that assist others in making use of AI.  Examples include the intermediaries noted above, AI data labellers and other model trainers, AI skills trainers, local hosts of AI data and models, those who facilitate use of AI in organisations, etc.
  • Producer: creation of customised AI goods and services.  Examples include individuals who use existing code or models to create a new model for a niche market.
  • Innovator: development of new AI.  Overlapping into the previous category, this involves AI R&D, ranging up to the creation of new foundation models.

National AI Roles

The AI roles above can be scaled up to national level and, in the Salon, four roles were the main focus for discussion; roles that could be seen as archetypes that global South countries may fill:

  • Data Mine: an indirect role to feed local data into large language and similar models.  While potentially beneficial in helping address the biases and other problems arising in those models due to their lack of global South data, this is unlikely to produce value for global South countries.  Rather the value would be captured by the – typically Western or Chinese – owners of the model.
  • Consumer: simple use of existing e.g. generative AI can help to a certain extent to substitute for expertise that is often in short supply in the global South.  But the generality, lags, biases, hallucinations, lack of transparency, etc of these models severely limits the potential value of this role.
  • Consumer-Plus: using existing models but solely with local datasets will overcome a number of the shortcomings of the consumer approach.  But resource requirements are greater, dataset quality may be a challenge, and value may be somewhat constrained.
  • Local Niche Producer: this covers, for example, building small language models in specific sectors – health, education, legal were all examples offered at the Salon.  But the focus is always within-country; hence bounding the value generation.

From what was discussed, it appeared that local niche producer was the aspiration, or maybe one should say the highest value-adding role that many global South countries could aspire to.  But the question remains whether countries could look beyond their own borders: for example to develop niche AI products that could be exported regionally or globally.  Or even to take on global innovator roles given that the resource requirements for AI development are coming down.

In many ways, these are exactly the same strategic decisions that global South countries faced 20-plus years ago in relation to their software industries.  One interesting line of enquiry will be to look back at the lessons learned, and see how they apply to the nascent AI industries of the South.

An Adapted Digital-Transformation-for-Development Organisational Strategy Framework

What issues should shape organisational digital-transformation-for-development (DX4D) strategy?

One way to answer this is through adaptation of one of the most widely-cited guides to digital transformation strategy, the Digital Transformation Framework[i].  The Framework provides a series of strategic questions that managers “have to address when embarking on digital transformation”, divided into four areas: use of technologies, change in value creation, structural changes, and finance.  They do not per se constitute a strategy, and nor should they be seen as exhaustive but they provide a frame for digital transformation strategy.

These questions derive from experiences of German private sector media companies, and so have been adapted below to make them more relevant to the context of development organisations.  We start with an adapted definition of strategy itself:

A digital transformation strategy signposts the way toward digital transformation and guides managers through the transformation process resulting from the integration and use of digital technologies. A digital transformation strategy impacts an organisation more comprehensively than an IT strategy and addresses potential effects on interactions across organisational borders with clients, collaborators and suppliers

DX4D Organisational Strategy Framework

1. Use of Technologies

Involves assessment of the role of ICTs and of the IT/ICT department in the organisation.

Question Strategic Options Description
1a. How significant is your organisation’s ICT to achieving strategic goals? Enabler ICT is an enabler of strategic goals
Supporter ICT is seen as a support function to reach strategic goals
1b. How ambitious is your organisation’s approach to new digital technologies? Innovator The organisation is at the forefront of innovating new technologies
Early adopter The organisation actively looks for opportunities to implement new technologies
Follower The organisation relies on well-established solutions

2. Changes in Value Creation

Involves assessment of the way in which digital technologies alter the organisation’s core business model[ii].

Question Strategic Options Description
2a. How is digital tech used in external client engagement and delivery? Enhanced External-facing systems are fully digitalised
Extended External-facing systems’ data structures and work processes are redesigned and optimised through use of digital
Redefined External-facing systems are creating new sources of value for clients through use of digital
2b. How is digital tech used in the organisation’s internal systems? Optimised Internal-facing systems are fully digitalised
Integrated Internal-facing systems are fully digitally-integrated
Leveraged New sources of value are leveraged from the data available within integrated organisational systems

3. Structural Changes

Involves assessment of the implications of transformation of organisational structures.

Question Strategic Options Description
3a. Who is in charge of digital transformation? Organisational CEO Overall Chief Executive Officer
Organisational CDO Overall Chief Digital Officer
Organisational CIO/CITO Overall Chief Information/IT Officer
Departmental head Head of individual department or function within the organisation
3b. Do you plan to integrate new operations/business models into existing structures or create a new entity? Integrated Digital operations for new business models will be fully-integrated into the organisation’s current structures
Separated Digital operations for new business models will be implemented separate from the existing core organisation
3c. What type of operational changes do you expect? Services and products New organisational services and (if relevant) products
Business processes New / improved business processes
Skills New skills because of digital and other changes
3d. How will any new competencies be acquired? Internally Relying on existing resources
Partnership Fostered via links with external partners
External sourcing Sourcing additional competencies from outside

4. Finance

Involves assessment of the pressures and financial resources that digital transformation will entail.

Question Strategic Options Description
4a. How strong are financial and other pressures for change? Low Core activities are subject to few external pressures for change
Medium Core activities are sustainable but subject to external pressures for change
High Current core activities are not sustainable due to external pressures for change
4b. How will your organisation finance digital transformation? Internal From existing internal funds
External Additional external funding will be required

As noted, this is not an exhaustive list and revision suggestions are welcome, but this can be at least a relevant starting point for organisational DX4D strategy.

Image source: Digital Transformation Vectors by Vecteezy


[i] Hess, T., Matt, C., Benlian, A., & Wiesböck, F. (2016). Options for formulating a digital transformation strategy. MIS Quarterly Executive15(2), republished as Hess, T., Matt, C., Benlian, A., & Wiesböck, F. (2020). Options for formulating a digital transformation strategy in: Strategic Information Management, R.D. Galliers, D.E. Leidner & B. Simeonova (eds), Routledge, New York, NY, 151-173.

[ii] Adapted from ideas in: Collins, K. (2018) Strategy, leadership and team building. In: Transformational Leadership and Not for Profits and Social Enterprises. Wiltshire, K., Malhotra, A., Axelsen, M. (eds.) Routledge, London, 239-263.

Methods for Investigating Digital Personalised Learning in Kenya: Utilising A/B Testing to Evaluate Software Adaptivity Features

Chen Sun, Louis Major, Nariman Moustafa, Rebecca Daltry

This blog focuses on a research study investigating the impact of Digital Personalised Learning (DPL) on pre-primary education in Kenya. The study features utilising A/B testing to examine the pedagogical implications and learning effectiveness of various design features in a classroom-integrated DPL tool.

DPL is attracting increasing interest from researchers and practitioners, given its potential to adapt to individual needs and empower learners to determine their own pace and timing of learning [1, 2]. However, research on DPL to-date has primarily focused on high-income and well-resourced contexts, creating an opportunity to investigate its role in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [4]. Growing evidence indicates that DPL [6] could play an important role in improving learning outcomes in LMICs. For instance, DPL might help address challenges such as limited teaching resources, increase learner access to education inside and outside of school, enable remediation based on individual learning levels, and mitigate the negative effects of high teacher-learner ratios. Within the ICT4D community, there has been an expansive conversation on using technology to address development challenges and improve the quality of life in global south economies. Yet, there is scope for further discussion on the development of DPL in these regions.  

Multi-strand Research on Integrating DPL in Kenyan Pre-primary Education

Researchers from the University of Manchester have been working as part of an EdTech Hub research study alongside other Hub colleagues, and in partnership with EIDU and Women Educational Researchers of Kenya, to investigate the development and evaluation of a DPL tool used by early-grade learners. In this context, an ambitious multi-strand research study (2022-25) is rigorously evaluating contextually appropriate pedagogical and software approaches for integrating DPL into schools in Kenya. The principal research question is: How can a classroom-based DPL tool most effectively support early-grade numeracy and literacy outcomes in Kenya? This research focuses on the use of the EIDU DPL tool, deployed on low-cost Android devices.

Research on Adaptivity and Data Feedback

This blog specifically explores one aspect of the larger multi-strand research study introduced above, focusing on adaptivity and data feedback. This particular study strand zeroes in on the question of designing and assessing various personalisation features in the EIDU DPL tool for pre-primary learning. In the study, one or two smartphone devices are distributed to each classroom. The learner-facing interface contains learning units targeting specific literacy and numeracy skills, and the teacher-facing interface (depending on the software version) can include lesson plans aligned with the Kenyan curriculum. The DPL tool also facilitates adaptive assessment and measurement strategies, generating continuous insights into learning. The main adaptivity feature of the DPL tool determines the sequence of learning content for a particular learner. To date, around 250,000 active learners from 4,000 pre-primary schools in Kenya are using EIDU.

DPL Adaptivity Feature Design Through Iterative Rounds of Software Interventions

Here, we reflect on the methods that facilitate this particular strand of research, which is concerned with the question: how can various adaptivity features of the EIDU DPL tool support classroom teaching and learning? One key area of our collaboration is to identify software changes that can be implemented within the DPL tool to test their effects on learning scores and engagement. Three iterative rounds of adaptive feature design have taken place, which have resulted in the development of four software interventions directed at learners, and five that cater to teachers. All nine software features aim at enhancing digital personalisation. 

The learner-facing personalisation features focus on providing adaptive learning paths for individual learners. For example, one intervention tests different personalisation algorithms that are designed to select the most suitable learning activities based on the performance history of learners’ interaction with the DPL tool’s learning content. The designed algorithms select the next learning activity either to maximise scores or learners’ engagement level, as opposed to a learner progressing through a curriculum following a fixed sequence carefully arranged by educational experts. 
The teacher-facing personalisation features explore how to meaningfully present learners’ data to teachers. The intended aim is to empower teachers with a better understanding of learners’ performance, enabling them to make informed pedagogical decisions and intervene when needed. For example, teachers can view a dashboard demonstrating learners’ progress and where learners are categorised in terms of competency levels per curriculum item. This EdTech Hub blog outlines further information on the nine interventions. 

A/B Testing: A Software Design Evaluation Method

Understanding the impact of those personalisation features on learning and teaching poses a challenge. To address this, A/B testing is employed to test the comparative effectiveness of designed software features. A/B testing is a controlled experimental study for evaluating the efficacy of design elements by randomly assigning participants to different software versions [3]. This random assignment intends to minimise bias and ensures comparability between different software versions. Further, A/B testing enables continuous and unobtrusive large-scale experimentation, allowing for the assessment of design changes in technology-enhanced learning environments without interrupting regular teaching activities [5]. The purpose of implementing A/B testing in this study is to identify effective personalisation features that can enhance learning outcomes for pre-primary education in Kenya. 

The personalisation design features are first pilot tested among a small sample of 20 pre-primary schools, where teacher feedback and classroom observations are obtained to further understand the user experience. When no abnormalities are detected during the pilot, the features are then released as an A/B test to EIDU’s mass user base of around 250,000 monthly active learners. The A/B test typically lasts for a school term, as this represents a predetermined period of time to ensure consistent learning experiences throughout the test duration. 

At the time of writing, some of the tests are still running, with these scheduled to conclude by April 2024. Testing is continuously monitored by EIDU, and all data collected via the software is anonymised at source by assigning unique user IDs [3]. Since September 2023, the team have been analysing anonymous data to gauge the impact of those design elements. The findings provide direct input into the design and development of the EIDU tool in the Kenyan context and open up avenues for future research. For example, design features that lead to improved learning outcomes can be implemented as default settings, and new features can be launched as a series of A/B tests to continuously refine and optimise the DPL tool.

A/B Testing: Reflections on Opportunities and Limitations

The use of A/B testing in this research strand opens up new opportunities for understanding the impact of DPL tool design features on pre-primary learning in LMICs. By conducting a series of A/B tests, we are able not only to identify what works best from a pedagogical perspective but also to uncover how personalisation can be effectively integrated into classrooms at scale. Additionally, A/B testing allows for the optimisation of software design through continuous iterations and refinements without disrupting the user experience. This approach offers an innovative methodology in educational research, particularly for large-scale experiments involving a large number of learners. 

Nonetheless, as A/B testing primarily focuses on software-generated data, it is important to acknowledge how some external factors which influence a learner’s performance may be overlooked. Thus, to gain a more comprehensive understanding, it is highly valuable to complement A/B testing with rigorous qualitative data, such as classroom observation. Additionally, there is a separation between researchers and the actual classroom environment. This detachment requires careful ethical consideration of matters related to data collection, usage and storage, in recognition of the distance between researcher and participant. To bridge this gap and ensure the transparency and accountability of the research, the team is committed to sharing a concise summary of findings and outcomes in an accessible format at the study’s end, available to all participants.

Despite these complex considerations, our experience with A/B testing suggests the potential of utilising this method in digital education research. Pioneering an innovative research method requires collaboration between multiple stakeholders, including but not limited to education researchers, data scientists, developers and educators, to think about the different pedagogical, ethical and technological elements involved. Sharing our insights with the ICT4D community is to invite a conversation on how A/B testing and other innovative research methodologies for large-scale software experiments can be adapted and refined for different research contexts.

References

[1] Bernacki, M. L., Greene, M. J., & Lobczowski, N. G. (2021). A systematic review of research on personalized learning: Personalized by whom, to what, how, and for what purpose (s)?. Educational Psychology Review, 33(4), 1675-1715. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-021-09615-8

[2] Bhutoria, A. (2022). Personalized education and artificial intelligence in the United States, China, and India: A systematic review using a human-in-the-loop model. Computers and Education: Artificial Intelligence, 3, 100068. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.caeai.2022.100068

[3] Friedberg, A. (2023). Can A/B Testing at Scale Accelerate Learning Outcomes in Low- and Middle-Income Environments?. In: Wang, N., Rebolledo-Mendez, G., Dimitrova, V., Matsuda, N., Santos, O.C. (eds) Artificial Intelligence in Education. Posters and Late Breaking Results, Workshops and Tutorials, Industry and Innovation Tracks, Practitioners, Doctoral Consortium and Blue Sky. AIED 2023. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1831. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36336-8_119

[4] Major, L., Francis, G. A., & Tsapali, M.. (2021). The effectiveness of technology-supported personalised learning in low- and middle-income countries: A meta-analysis. British Journal of Educational Technology, 52, 1935–1964. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.13116

[5] Savi, A. O., Ruijs, N. M., Maris, G. K. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2018). Delaying access to a problem-skipping option increases effortful practice: Application of an A/B test in large-scale online learning. Computers & Education, 119, 84–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2017.12.008

[6] Van Schoors, R., Elen, J., Raes, A., & Depaepe, F. (2021). An overview of 25 years of research on digital personalised learning in primary and secondary education: A systematic review of conceptual and methodological trends. British Journal of Educational Technology, 52, 1798–1822. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.13148

China’s digital expansion in the Global South: Systematic literature review and future research agenda

What are the implications for the global South of China’s emergence as a digital superpower?

A recently-published literature review from myself and colleagues at the University of Manchester identifies seven key issues that have so far emerged:

  • Chronology: a steady progression of Chinese investment in the global South up the digital stack (see Figure 1) since the 1990s.
  • Synergies and Tensions: an external image of “Team China” with strong state financial and political support for overseas growth of Chinese tech firms but, underneath, some strains between state and firms, and competition between the firms themselves.
  • State Strategy that espouses mutual “win-win” between China and global South countries in public, but which has been single-minded in delivering benefits for China from its external digital strategy.  Perhaps not so different from the approach of some Western nations.
  • Design and Implementation: just a few nuggets suggesting Chinese digital developers may undertake “South-South” knowledge transfer e.g. from experiences in Chinese rural markets, but also that practice may differ quite a lot from the Principles for Digital Development.
  • Impact: a delivery of economic and political benefits for China; a likely delivery of economic and political benefits for recipient countries in the South but with few well-researched examples; and a whole set of “concerns”.  Talked up by Sinophobic researchers and talked down by Sinophilic researchers, the concerns include data security and sovereignty; control over digital infrastructure; dependency and vulnerability to Chinese state leverage; digitally-enabled inequalities both between and within countries; and environmental impact.
  • “Digital Authoritarianism”: rhetoric in US-origin literature about China exporting digital authoritarianism seems to run well ahead of evidence, to ignore the many Western nations exporting surveillance systems to the global South, and to ignore that demand-pull from the global South dominates supply-push.  But one should not swing too far the other way: China is now the South’s primary surveillance supplier, and the relationship between Chinese firms and Chinese state is not an exact mirror of Western equivalents.
  • Global Digital Governance: a divergence of worldviews between the West and China on internet governance, digital standards, and data governance, with each side actively recruiting global South countries to their cause.

Figure 1: The Chinese technology stack

Although this research has been helpful, the rather small corpus of work so far published leaves not just a general knowledge gap around China’s digital expansion but also a specific six-part future research agenda:

  1. More Southern Voices: more Southern-based researchers, more South-focused empirics, and more evidence from Southern policy-makers, implementers, local tech firms, consumers, etc.
  2. Moving Up the Tech Stack: given the main research focus to date has been on telecom infrastructure there now needs to be more investigation of application platforms and services including e-commerce, smart cities, artificial intelligence, ICT4D projects, etc.
  3. Beyond “Team China”: moving beyond specu­lation to understand the actual coherence, collabora­tion, competition, and conflict between different Chinese state agencies, between Chinese state agencies and tech firms, between Chinese tech firms, and between Chinese ICT and non-ICT businesses.
  4. Between Sinophobia and Sinophilia: steering between the stereotypically-extreme views of some US and Chinese literature, and simultaneously steering between Sino-exceptionalism (treating China as a unique case) and Sino-identicaism (seeing China as just replicating patterns of Western (US particularly) digital imperialism).
  5. Local Agency: pushing past the neocolonialism of much current literature that focuses on Chinese and Western actors and sees those in global South as mere pawns in a new Great Game; to ask – for example – what room for manoeuvre global South actors have in procurement, in digital policy and in international forums; and to ask what digital alignment strategies they can best adopt.
  6. Local Development Impact: assessing the true cost-benefit of Chinese telecom infrastructure, data centres, platforms, etc., and the macro-level impact on local polities, debt, labour markets, etc.

Content in this post summarises the paper, “China’s digital expansion in the Global South: Systematic literature review and future research agenda”, published in the journal, The Information Society.

Get the full picture by reading the paper at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01972243.2024.2315875

The rise of post-disaster digital communities: what role in shaping the humanitarian space and action?

Nimesh Dhungana (nimesh.dhungana@manchester.ac.uk)

How are post-disaster digital communities emerging and shaping the nature of humanitarian space and action?

Enabled by the growing proliferation of mobile technologies, online platforms and open source data, and dubbed by some as “Digital Humanitarianism” (1) or “Digital Disaster Communities (DDC)” (2), communities from disparate locales are increasingly acting as early-responders to humanitarian crises that may have until recently seemed distant and remote. Despite the increasing prominence of post-disaster digital communities, disaster and humanitarian scholars have been slow to theorise and critically examine their emergence, characteristics, and socio-political impacts. In my research, I have been investigating the politics of post-disaster digital organising; first as part of my PhD research in the wake of the 2015 Nepal earthquakes and, more recently, during the Covid-19 pandemic, through the Atlantic Equity Challenge-funded collaborative project with Accountability Lab, a Nepal-based youth-led organisation. Our emerging findings indicate three interrelated pathways through which digital communities are shaping humanitarian space and action.

First, digital communities are actively asserting their role in redefining how post-disaster humanitarian aid is mobilised and distributed and, in the process, reconfiguring the representation of the humanitarian crisis itself. The 2015 Nepal earthquakes witnessed the emergence of a range of digital volunteers who used crowdsourcing, crisis mapping, and infographics to establish their interpretation of the scale of the crisis, who deserves aid, where and in what forms. Such forms of digital politics of aid eligibility resonate with other post-disaster contexts, notably following the 2010 Haiti earthquake (2). In Nepal, though, the involvement of digital communities was not limited to the emergency response but also found their engagement in the latter stages of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As one example, Kathmandu Living Labs, a Nepal-based civic tech organisation, partnered with the National Planning Commission to collect data on the scale and intensity of the destruction of residential houses as part of the National Housing and Reconstruction Survey. Their ‘digital feedback’ initiative resulted in one of the largest post-disaster datasets, setting the evidence-based logics for the longer-term reconstruction, coupled with the conditions and eligibility for State-sponsored housing assistance. Likewise, during the COVID-19 pandemic, several youth groups resorted to online monitoring, for instance, to track the supply of medical supplies such as oxygen cylinders. In so doing, these online communities posed a newer set of questions about equity and inclusion in the governance of a health emergency.

Second, digital communities are increasingly redefining the arena of rights-based humanitarian action despite the authorities’ tendency to restrict people’s rights in the name of a coherent disaster response. Combining off-line community activism with community-based hotlines, community radios, and mobile feedback applications, in Nepal, a group of mobile monitors emerged and acted as ‘information agents’, safeguarding disaster-affected communities’ constitutionally guaranteed right to information concerning the nature of aid distribution (4). Such efforts to generate and transmit credible information also found their place in the wake of COVID-19. Notably, Shramik Sanjal, an online community of international migrants, actively utilised their Facebook account to dispel rumours and misinformation that they considered were exposing fellow migrants to the risk of infection. These myriad forms of digital organising, some spearheaded by those who are often considered ‘vulnerable’, represent a wider struggle to establish people’s ‘right to know’ and ‘be heard’ in the face of a major crisis.

Third, post-disaster digital communities are assuming a much more contentious and political role, centred on demanding accountability and justice from authorities for their failures in preparing for and responding to disasters. During both the 2015 Nepal earthquakes and COVID-19, online platforms such as Twitter (now X) and change.org were widely leveraged to serve as alert systems, laying bare the potential for corruption and abuse of power in the name of disaster response. Indeed, the deployment of online platforms to demand bottom-up accountability during COVID-19 was not limited to Nepal. In the UK, for instance, the survivors of COVID-19 and bereaved families put together online petitions, among other offline initiatives, to demand accountability from the government, providing a much-needed push for the formation of the ongoing UK COVID-19 Inquiry.

The growing intermingling of offline and online disaster communities represents the active reshaping of the humanitarian space, which was for a long time occupied and dominated by the international aid actors and the State but, in recent years, has become far more de-centred, contested and fluid (5). Even under politically restricted contexts, disaster survivors are resorting to data and digital platforms to deepen the values of transparency and trust in post-disaster recovery (6). At the same time, the rise of post-disaster digital communities has raised several questions that merit further investigation.

Research on data-driven civic initiatives has shown their tendency to overlook and even worsen socio-political inequalities due to their narrow fixation on leveraging open and ‘Big Data’ Fields (7). What are the larger socio-political conditions under which digital communities emerge and evolve post-disaster? Linked to this is also the question of the consequential value of these groups beyond their role as aid monitors, eligibility auditors and alert systems, as highlighted above. Can digital communities hold the power-holders accountable for their failure to prevent disaster, or mount a fair and equitable disaster response? These questions demand longitudinal and embedded studies that can trace the conditions under which they function, how they function and the socio-political consequences of their organising. Finally, while digital communities claim to help expedite post-disaster solidarity networks, how solidarity itself, defined as a socio-political practice of inclusion, reciprocity and peer-to-peer accountability, features in the internal workings of digital communities is far less known. In particular, whether or how the voices of those whom digital communities claim to ‘help’ are included in the design and deployment of digital or data-driven technologies remains under-examined. As disasters become more frequent and intense, and digital communities actively rely on data to shape humanitarian action, how data collected from vulnerable communities are protected from misuse is another concern that merits further investigation.

1.         Meier P. Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is changing the face of humanitarian response. Taylor & Francis; 2015.

2.         Chaffee D. Digital Disaster Communities. In: Elliot A, Hsu EL, editors. The Consequences of Global Disasters. Routledge; 2016. p. 80–94. 

4.         Dhungana N. Doing Civil Society-Driven Social Accountability in a Disaster Context: Evidence from Post-Earthquake Nepal. Polit Gov [Internet]. 2020 Dec 10 [cited 2022 Oct 24];8(4):395–406. Available from: https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3154

5.         Hilhorst D, Jansen BJ. Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday Politics of Aid. Dev Change [Internet]. 2010 [cited 2024 Feb 19];41(6):1117–39. Available from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01673.x

6. Xu B. The Politics of Compassion: The Sichuan Earthquake and Civic Engagement in China. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 2017. 256 p.

7.         Mulder F, Ferguson J, Groenewegen P, Boersma K, Wolbers J. Questioning Big Data: Crowdsourcing crisis data towards an inclusive humanitarian response. Big Data Soc [Internet]. 2016 Dec 1 [cited 2023 Jul 27];3(2):2053951716662054. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716662054

From word-of-mouth to star ratings: Platforms and the changing nature of trust in the informal sector 

By Mindy Park, Arfive Gandhi, Yudho Giri Sucahyo 

Do digital platforms formalise informal cities? 

To some, the arrival and penetration of digital platforms in the vast informal economies of the global South cities may sound no longer new. To others, it still is a momentous opportunity to transform the informal sector. As the bustling streets fuse into the virtual marketplaces, the dynamics of transactions, trust, and community are being reshaped. To explore the renewed landscape of informal economies in the platform age, we illustrate the changing nature of trust by drawing on our recent research on platform use in the informal sector in Jakarta, Indonesia. 

Broadly, there are two important impacts of platformisation in the informal sector: incorporation and legitimisation. Platforms are seen to incorporate the informal sector into the broader economy. In doing so, certain platform features aim to guarantee the credibility and transparency of informal practices that are often deemed untrustworthy without active regulations in place. While some might frame this process as “formalisation of the informal sector”, in fact, platformisation itself hardly formalises existing sectors. What it does is simply insert the previously informal or marginalised groups into the wider urban economy, both as consumers and as traders.  

Then the legitimising effect is the impact of this insertion on trust building. What enables this trust are the new platform features (e.g., ratings/reviews and digital payment) that replace the traditional ways of building reputation and making transactions in the informal economy. Linking platforms with trust somewhat disguises us into thinking that there was simply no trust in the informal sector before platforms. On the contrary, trust was the most important factor that sustained the informal sector – word of mouth shaped trust and trust worked as an important “informal” institution even in the absence of formal regulations1. In other words, with nothing much but mutual trust that people could resort to, trust has been the basis for their informal trade. 

With these incorporation and legitimisation effects, platformisation leads to evolving dynamics of trust amongst informal workers and consumers. In the traditional informal sector, the boundary of the interaction and social networks was largely within the physical informal city. The key change in the platformised city is that everyday interactions move beyond this physical informal space towards wider virtual networks that involve not only the informal class but also the middle and elite classes. That is, now the boundary that forms word-of-mouth has become much wider. The ratings and reviews formed by broader consumers (or simply the general public) shape reputations of platformised informal firms, not just the word-of-mouth formed within their existing social networks confined to the physical city.  

These dynamics are illustrated in our research in Jakarta. Here are several remarks and comments from the motorcycle drivers, street vendors and consumers in the informal sector, who now have become part of ride-hailing, delivery, and fintech platforms. These provide a glimpse of how differentiated their experiences are, and intriguingly, the way they express distrust against one another. For example: 

When asked about any negative or exploitative experiences working as platform drivers, they often mention how consumers or restaurant owners are treating them.  

  •  “Sometimes passengers/customers use threatening or aggressive language” 
  • “Their policies prioritise consumers. Drivers should only comply with the rules and ethical codes, which is not always easy” 
  • “Platforms’ customer service only makes consumers more talkative” 
  • “Platform fees include parking fees, but sometimes restaurants charge us these additional fees (due to misunderstandings of rules)” 

On the other hand, being entrepreneurs (albeit micro in scale), street vendors exercise more control over their business.  

  • I run this business, so I should take care of my customers myself. I can handle them myself and they’re (platforms) not part of it” 
  • In light of customer satisfaction, platform intervention is only a form of passive monitoring. Each business is already proactive in seeking solutions on its own” 

In the meantime, when asked about their overall experiences with platform use, some consumers are not entirely happy with drivers. 

  • “Platform providers should carry out regular evaluations of workers on their digital platforms. So that workers with bad and dangerous ratings do not continue to work on the platform or are trained so that they do not endanger consumers” 
  • “Platforms should try to increase motorcycle drivers’ digital literacy” 

Overall, the reality of platformisation is less aligned to claims of economic opportunities in incorporation and legitimacy in formalisation. Rather it presents new, more challenging domains around trust. With strong consumer beliefs in platforms’ contribution to transparency and a sense of distrust towards worker behaviour, these seem to amplify the distrust citizens already had against the informal sector (and vice versa). Adding fuel to this distrust may be heightened competition even amongst the drivers, street vendors and entrepreneurs. 

This might eventually hamper city-wide collective movements. With platform ecosystems still dependent on existing socio-cultural moral norms and class, negotiations between agents of differential power arise and contribute to shifting the consumer culture in platform use2. Although there is growing conscientisation of the often exploitative and adverse impacts of platforms on workers across the globe, with a lack of trust, widespread collective action around platforms is less evident in the Indonesian context (but still, drawing only from a handful of comments above, we would not say it is conclusive yet). 

In the end, this is neither to romanticise traditional informality nor to critique consumers. Of course, trust only cannot fully fill the voids of formal institutions that are to serve broader purposes such as safety, protection as well as market efficiency. The solution also does not seem to be in denouncing “platform algorithms” that can make contributions to filling some (but with equal importance, not all) of the voids. Nevertheless, paying attention to the evolving dynamics of trust will shed new light on the way we understand the impacts of platforms and trust in the informal economy.  

As this evidence shows, we need to examine further the intersections of platforms and informality. What are the dynamics of legitimisation and extraction, control and autonomy, and order and freedom to make our platformised cities healthier?  

References

1 Burbidge, D (2013) ‘Trust creation in the informal economy: the case of plastic bag sellers of Mwanza, Tanzania’, African Sociological Review, 17(1): 79-103. 

Odera, L.C (2013) ‘The role of trust as an informal institution in the informal sector in Africa’, Africa Development, 38(3-4): 121-146. 

2 Rava, N & Lalvani, S (2022) ‘The moral economy of platform work’, Asiascape: Digital Asia, 9(0): 144-174, https://brill.com/view/journals/dias/9/1-2/article-p144_8.xml?language=en&ebody=pdf-89805.